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Drought and Hunger Southern Africa 1994-1996  
(Four Horsemen Are Gathering In The Kraal)
From the reports I see (and visual impressions in Mozambique and Tanzania) I fear a 
severe drought - and therefore food security - crisis is on the move. While it could be 
alleviated - especially in Northern Mozambique, Tanzania and Angola - by late rains, a 
seriously below normal output now appears to be virtually irreversible. If  that is the case 
it is imperative early warning leads to early amber lights and preparation for a red alert 
with tocsin by March 15 and a global appeal meeting by April 15 (about two months 
ahead o f the 1991-1993 schedule).
If later or fuller reports available to you demonstrate that I am overly worried or all my 
subsequent suggestions are already in hand then my apologies - in either case Thank God! 
and in the latter my congratulations on being in a position to react so rapidly.
For at least Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Angola the implications 
o f a severely below normal set o f  1995 harvests are devastating.
Mozambique has on the order o f 2-3 million people who returned home after the 1994 
harvest. If their first crop fails they are in absolute need o f emergency food supplies if 
their lives are not to be at risk and if the whole economic rehabilitation process is not to be 
derailed.
Tanzania had relatively poor harvests in many regions in 1993 and 1994. Its physical 
reserves were also drawn down by loans to UNHCR/WFP for refugees and have not, as I 
understood it in September, been fully replenished. In addition it has severe fiscal 
problems. That means it needs funding for local purchases in surplus areas and transport 
to supply drought afflicted ones as well as (or instead of) imported food aid.
Zimbabwe already suffers from poor animal spirits of entrepreneurs which have been 
battered by the 1993 GDP collapse stemming from the last drought, devaluation's impact 
on imported capital goods and the discovery liberalisation applied to their support 
mechanisms too! A major loss o f  rural income and thus domestic demand will have a 
disastrous 2 to 3 year impact on investment and general business climate - i.e. there is a 
special case for work for food projects as a main vehicle of food security support.
South Africa's transitional problems - and the implicit over-demands o f  reconciliation, plus 
fiscal prudence, plus stemming the 1960-1993 rise in non-directly political violence 
stemming from the loss o f hope and denial o f human dignity, plus measures in the ANC's 
Plan - will be compounded by any serious loss o f agricultural production. True enough a 
drought o f lesser proportions than 1991/2 may not create a physical food security problem 
per se. But exports and entitlements will be lost, posing major external balance and fiscal 
problems.
Angola goes into 1995 facing the certainty o f  serious hunger and the real danger of 
pockets o f starvation as a result o f war even if 1995 harvests are good (albeit inevitably on 
lower than 'normal' hectarage) and the Lusaka Accords do hold with peace breaking out. 
With drought major food aid requirements arise for the provincial capitals and the 
agricultural areas swept into the 1993-94 third Angolan war. (1961-1975, 1980-1991, 
1992-1994.)
I am less well informed on the other countries. However, if southern Malawi is afflicted 
this is even normally an area o f  massive under-nutrition and absolute poverty while 
Zambia is in the middle o f  attempting to restore fiscal stability and halt disintegration of 
household purchasing power, so that both countries are exceptionally vulnerable to shocks 
which have major direct impact on household incomes, fiscal support for household 
survival and the balance o f  payments. The overall impact on Botswana, Swaziland and 
Lesotho is unclear. Because all are net grain importers to a substantial proportion o f 
normal year consumption they may be less affected at macro level. However, the 
entitlements and, therefore, the fiscal implications o f any significant grain output fall 
would be serious.
About the rain there is little to be done beyond recording - and praying. About the 
response to its full or partial absence 1991-1993 indicates there is a good deal to be done - 
faster, more fully and on a more coordinated basis than was possible in 1991-1993 (which 
itself was much more effective than, and learned from, the not very effective 1984-1985 
SADCC efforts):
1. The SADC Food Security Unit (your Unit) and its national analogues should pool all 
present data and forecasts by January 15 and hold an emergency meeting by January
30;
2. Unless the conclusions are much more reassuring than seems probable, FAO-WFP-UN 
Humanitarian-UNICEF should be approached tentatively January 15/definitively 
February 1 for a full-scale regional evaluation mission February 15-28;
3. Governments should immediately begin to estimate how much o f what (food aid, cash 
for local purchases; logistic support o f  equipment, cash and or persons; foreign NGO 
backup to the domestic social sector; emergency water supply enhancement) they need 
to present (preferably) to WFP-FAO-UN Humanitarian-UNICEF mission and at the 
latest to an April 15 SADC/UN Humanitarian/UN Family/SADC Member 
States/Bilaterals-EU Pledging and Planning Meeting. Your Unit should - if possible - 
stand ready to provide technical assistance to national units in preparing these working 
plans;
4. SATCC should dust off 1991-1993 records and begin preliminary consultation and 
logistical planning for a new (probably significantly smaller) peak load 
allocation/handling blueprint. In addition it should consult Malawi and Mozambique
on the state o f Ncala-Intralagos rail reconstruction and the possibility o f  emergency 
measures to increase capacity by the last quarter o f 1995;
5. Your Unit could usefully consult with Global Coalition for African Co-Chairmen about 
how GCA could usefully participate in (sub) Regional efforts and also with World 
Bank which is (vied Zimbabwe loan in 1994) well aware food import requirements and 
both domestic purchasing power and fiscal base shrinkages play havoc with SAPs (or 
any coherent macroeconomic strategy designed under initial extreme scarcity o f 
resource constraints). You might also wish to consider pre-consulting the IMF (I 
would suggest via the Reserve Bank o f Zimbabwe) to ascertain a) what effective 
trigger for IMF 'food security' drawing would be; b) how long it would take to secure 
it from time o f application, c) whether such a drawing by an ESAF eligible country 
could be on ESAF terms ( it should be but I fear cannot be under present IMF rules 
but nothing lost trying to alter them - the present MD would in principle be not 
unsympathetic). In theory each country could do this itself but a single approach, 
reported to all 11 CB's who could then consider several and/or joint approaches (e.g. 
on ESAF terms issue) is likely to be more expeditions.
6. Among the issues countries may wish to consider are channels o f  distribution. Donor 
response outside a recipient coordination - supervision - control framework tends to 
be fragmentary, uncoordinated, duplicative, incomplete, conflicting and nationally both 
fragmenting and decapacitating. UN Humanitarian, WFP and UNICEF are allies in 
seeking national and regional coherence and coordination with the recipient 
governments and regional bodies as focal points. But how much they can assist 
depends on how well governments and regional bodies have coherent, practicable, well 
argued, strategic proposals with articulated capacity to implement them ready to put 
on the table.
Optimally most assistance would go to government emergency bodies and be 
channelled (not necessarily handled) by them. Other foreign official support could best 
be channelled via WFP and UNICEF who are sensitive to, and convinced o f  the value 
of, coordinating with governments and using domestic capacities to the maximum 
extent possible.
NGO's pose special problems. Optimally foreign NGO's should be required to support 
and to be accountable to domestic social sector bodies (e.g. Christian, Islamic, national 
Red Cross/Crescent) or local government. Realistically this cannot be a hard and fast 
line, but it can be reiterated as a desired route. Christian Aid, CAFOD, Action Aid, 
International Red Cross etc. do practice this approach. The burden o f  proof should be 
on those who choose not to do so.
Further governments should produced lists o f preferred international NGO's. (Lists o f 
unacceptable would probably be imprudent at this time.) Only too clearly at least three 
major foreign NGO's are inherently hostile to building government and/or domestic 
social sector capacity. If  at all possible this drought should not be made an
opportunity for them to renew, consolidate, or advance their already far too 
widespread presence.
7. W ater should be an integral part o f  SADC and Member State response/preplanning in 
1995. In 1993 more people were driven from their homes by lack o f water than o f 
food - notably so in Mozambique. Two metropolises (Bulawayo and Beira) were on 
the verge o f  needing to be evacuated by the time 1993 rains restored supplies. If 
analysis is done in January-February something can be done to avert massive forced 
movements o f  people and livestock and to limit losses o f livestock.
a. restoration o f  deteriorated protected springs and, especially, medium and deep 
wells;
b. management o f  reservoir releases on dammed rivers (a special South African- 
Swaziland-Mozambique coordination may now be practicable and useful);
c. emergency bringing forward o f  borehole drilling in severely at risk areas (e.g. 
much o f Southern Mozambique and parts o f central and western Tanzania);
d. emergency enhancement o f  capacity and identification o f backup facilities for cities 
(especially Bulawayo and Beira) known to be at risk (e.g. annually at or beyond 
system capacity during the dry season even in normal years).
8. Work for food (wages for public works financed by aid food programmes sales into 
the commercial network) programmes need to be planned - and logistics put in hand 
now if they are to be substantial channels for making emergency food aid market 
friendly (for the rural commercial and transport sectors and for those producers with 
surpluses) and supportive o f infrastructure rehabilitation, reconstruction and 
enhancement. Botswana does this moderately efficiently as did Zimbabwe in 1983 and 
1984 but not 1992.
9. The issue o f incentives (presumably in food but alternatively in cash) to low income 
workers who handle, transport, guard and distribute food aid needs to be faced 
squarely. Very low wage workers confronted with rising market food prices and 
hungry families will 'preempt' some food. It is both more efficient and more humane to 
identify by country (e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique, probably Angola, perhaps Zambia 
and Malawi) where such incentives are needed and to provide for recipient or donor 
finance in advance rather than to rant about 'leakages' after the event which is (at least 
in the first two countries cited) rather like complaining that water carried in a sieve in 
large part leaks away before it has been carried very far
10. Yes - the scale o f preparations proposed does entail expense - especially in respect to 
scarce analytical, logistic and programme preparation personnel time. And - at least 
on that scale - it may be over-preparation if late rains (as late as March-May in 
Northern Tanzania) are good. But the cost (in lives and national product) o f not
preparing if there is (as seems 2 or 3 to 1 probable as o f  now) a severe food 
production shortfall is much hiuher. Insurance policies always cost; this one is no 
exception. The problem is time lag - in 1992 serious warnings began in late January, 
FAOAVFP came in April (pressured forward from June), the pledging conference was 
in June (and some pledges rather earlier), actual deliveries to consumers in Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique became significant over late August to late September which was 
just on time to avert mass starvation as Zimbabwe's capacity to import commercially 
and Mozambique's physical stocks were virtually extinct by then. I truly hope I am 
wrong on the situation but I doubt it. I also hope I am not being presumptuous by 
suggesting things you already have in hand or have better substitute measures in train. 
(Or perhaps I should hope I am since then regionally and nationally capacity is in good 
working order.) But I fear we are all still on a learning curve in dealing with the 
limitation o f drought impact and the management o f drought impact alleviation 
resources so that some o f my ideas may be o f use to you or some o f the copied-to 
recipients. I am copying to a number o f those with whom I was in contact in 1992 
because the more key people have heard o f the impending disaster and present risk the 
better for hungry Southern Africans. And if they hear from you and from me at about 
the same time, no harm is done, au contraire parallel messages from different sources 
are often mutually reinforcing.
The brutal reality is that Southern Africa will have to compete to secure adequate food 
aid. Demand is up (especially as a result o f economic and political events in ex-USSR and 
ex-Yugoslavia) and supply is down (more because o f fiscal and policy choices than actual 
physical unavailability). Therefore, the earlier, the more convincing and the better 
presented the Southern African case the better. That 1991-1993 is viewed in aid circles as 
a notable success and some credit is given t,o country and SADC initiatives is a plus point 
to build upon.
My concerns, as you know, are first that Southern Africans are fed and collateral human 
and economic costs o f drought minimised; second that this be done in ways which increase 
African (government and social sector) capacity to design, to operate and to build as well 
as utilise domestic resources; and third is done in a regionally coordinated way as a 
significant aspect o f achieving the second objective.
